Saturday, September 6, 2008

Background to Plato
As I intimated on Thursday, we will discuss several key factors that I take to be essential to making sense of Plato. One is the history of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, which unfolded thoughout Plato's youth. You are reading excerpts from Thucydides' comprehensive history of that conflict, and I will give you a thumbnail overview on Tuesday of the events surrounding it as they relate directly to the execution of Plato's friend Socrates in 399 b.c.e. by the restored Athenian democracy.
Another piece of the puzzle, as I began to suggest on Thursday, is the complex relationship of Greek societies in the Fifth and early Fourth centuries b.c.e. to spoken and written language. Alphabetic writing was a relatively recent innovation (introduced probably sometime between 750 and 700 b.c.e.), and even in the late Fifth century Athens was still overwhelmingly an oral society, both in its commercial and its political dealings. Literacy was confined to a small elite, and the written word (and number) was largely a mnemonic and accounting device serving to support and reinforce memory, rather than a primary means of communication. This was changing of course, but slowly, and not without creating difficulties. As we shall see, Plato was both an advocate of new ways of doing things made possible in part by growing literacy, and at the same time deeply suspicious of writing as a substitute for interpersonal discourse (much as intellectuals today are often wary of electronics as a wholesale replacement for books, or for seminars).
Thirdly, in due course we will discuss the philosophical/scientific background to Plato's thought, beginning with Parmenides and Heraclitus in particular, and with the so-called Socratic Turn away from cosmological specuation and toward committed moral (and hence social) inquiry. Some of you have a strong background in earlier Ancient Greek thought, and you can be of service to us in helping to clarify these relationships.
A note on retaining the heading "Skeptiblog," which originally referred to a course last spring on ancient and contemporary Skepticism. In part because of Plato's artful use of the dialogue form (in which he himself never speaks), I concur with Alfred North Whitehead's assessment that in every utterance as to Plato we speak under correction. We needn't throw up our hands -- Plato's surviving writings are rich with possible conclusions -- but it is wise to be alert to our fallibility in attributing them wholesale to Plato himself.

Wednesday, April 23, 2008

Descartes, skepticism, and Bouwsma

Our reading of the Meditations suggests that Descartes's intellectually courageous strategy for refuting skepticsm ultimately fails. He begins by giving skepticism everything it could ask for, up to and including an evil genius, and then attempts to refute it through the application of clear and distinct reasoning to the cogito, the necessary existence of God, and the consequent knowability of the material world. The cogito is his Archimedean point, and God serves as lever by means of which he thinks he can, with care and difficulty, know the world. As we have seen, however, clarity and distinctness are slipperier than they appear, the arguments for God are dubious at best, and the skeptic is far from vanquished. Moreover, along the way Descartes's method yields an invidious and unsustainable metaphysical distinction between mind and body, of which we are justly skeptical.

So has the skeptic won the day? It seems that if like Descartes we grant the skeptic the most extreme hypothetical possibilities for being misled, including an evil genius, we forfeit the possibility of knowledge (whether apodictically certain or even probable). But is such an evil genius actually conceivable? Bouwsma tells a compelling story about why it is not, that the skeptic is not entitled to worry about global deception by an all-powerful deceiver, even as an abstract possibility. If Bouwsma is correct, then Descartes need not have yielded so much ground to the skeptic in the first place.

Thursday, April 3, 2008

The Tortoise and Achilles

Here is a link to a famous dialogue by Lewis Caroll (aka E.R. Dodson, Cambridge logician and mathematician). I read it as a comic but graphic example of the ultimate undefeatability of a certain sort of skepticism.

http://www.ditext.com/carroll/tortoise.html

Wednesday, April 2, 2008

Landesman's twelfth chapter nicely poses the impasse between Moore and the Skeptic. It becomes clear that the difficulty of adjudicating the dispute turns on the ambiguity of the ground-rules: On whom should the burden of proof fall? Must Moore prove that he knows his premise, here are two hands, or must the Skeptic prove that he does not know it?

By analogy, consider a court of law. A criminal defendant is not required to prove her innocence; rather the prosecution must show, beyond reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty, otherwise she goes free. But our problem is compounded. Not only must we determine in advance (and in some principled way) whether Moore or the Skeptic plays the role of prosecutor or defendant, we must determine whether this is a criminal, a civil, or some other kind of trial, and who precisely is qualified to sit on the jury. In a civil trial the prosecutor (or more properly plaintiff) must merely convince the jury that a preponderance of evidence, more than half of it, is against the defendant. The criminal standard is beyond reasonable doubt, meaning all but completely certain. Perhaps what we could call an epistemic trial demands a still higher standard, that of no possible doubt.

Perhaps we can stretch this metaphor, considering the alternative burdens and standards of proof, and find some clarity about the matter.

Thursday, March 20, 2008

G.E. Moore's Hands

There seems to be one thought about Moore's proof that Landesman does not explictly articulate, but that I have always taken to be at the heart of the argument. When Moore claims, in appropriate contexts, that "here are two hands," the reason he thinks both he and the rest of us know this to be true beyond reasonable doubt is that it is an evident fact which is already more certain than than any arguments for or against it could possibly be. That is, if I needed a further argument to convince you that these are in fact two hands, or appealed to a different argument to call it into question somehow, in order to do so I would have to appeal to other matters of fact and inference which are themselves less evident, certain, and known than the fact that these are two hands. On this account Moore does not need to establish "here are two hands" to an absolute certainty, but merely to a greater degree of certainty than any competitors.

If this analysis of what Moore is doing is correct, Moore does not after all defeat the skeptic in open battle, as it were, but rather covertly. By engaging the skeptic in a conversation using a shared language in which ordinary terms for objects (such as hands) are understood, and thus are understood as having the ontological and epistemic significance that they do in ordinary discourse, he lures the skeptic into using such words in the ordinary, commonsense manner. When the skeptic demures at the ontological or epistemological conclusions Moore draws, Moore can justly cry foul, since the skeptic, in agreeing to have the conversation, had agreed to the ordinary sense of its terms. The skeptic is free to quit the conversation, but at the expense of abandoning the use of words to mean what humans ordinarily take them to mean, which would condemn the skeptic, if not to all-out solipsism, at least to an extremely lonely "existence" (scare quotes to indicate that the skeptic gives a special, non-ontological or -epistemic, meaning to this and most other words).

Such a strategy seems better calculated than Descartes' actually to defeat the skeptic. Descartes, by giving the skeptic as much leeway to doubt as possible (with the dream and evil genius arguments), seems to give away the store, since the only remedy for such radical doubt Descartes can then muster is an a priori (and modal) proof for the necessary existence of an all-good and non-deceiving god. If that argument fails, as it seems to do, Descartes is left stranded on his tiny island of certainty (the cogito), not only a confirmed skeptic about everything else, but a solipsist to boot.

Thursday, March 13, 2008

On an unrelated topic...

I recently read a good article about single-payer healthcare at http://www.truthout.org/issues_06/020508HA.shtml, and it prompted me to imagine one reason more Americans aren't actively seeking such a system here.

In British Columbia, which the author cites from her own experience, income taxes are about 10% higher than in the U.S. to cover health care for everyone. It is not perfect, but it is a very economical, and equitable, system. Here in the U.S., 47 million people have no coverage at all, and even those who do have to argue constantly with their insurance carriers, in whose interest it is to deny coverage whenever possible. This is a highly inefficient, and inequitable, system. These facts are not really in dispute.

However, in the U.S., those of us whose employers currently pay the lion's share of our health insurance premiums would probably pay more out of pocket for health care if our income taxes went up 10% to cover it, even if our co-payments and the fraction of the premiums we now pay disappeared. In principle, of course, our employers could then pay us some of the difference (but no guarantees!), and there would be other benefits -- everyone would be covered, healthcare professionals could practice medicine instead of insurance triage, and so forth. But I suspect the general lack of enthusiasm for change in much of the comfortably employed and insured population (which includes most of those who vote) stems from a vague fear, perhaps not unfounded, that it will cost them.

Monday, March 10, 2008

Criteria of knowledge and wimpy skeptics

Sextus Empiricus seems to argue that there can be no rationally defensible criterion for what counts as knowledge, since any criterion would need a demonstration of its authoritative standing as a criterion, and such a demonstration would have to presuppose another criterion as its basis of justification.

Thus he comes to the uncomfortable position of claiming, as something known, that there can be no rationally defensible criterion of knowledge. In some passages he tries to weasel out of this consequence by describing skepticism as a mere attitude of non-commitment, rather than a judgement about something known. This wimpy version of skepticism wouldn't get him very far, however, for if skepticism is nothing more than an attitude, why should anyone else care?

Other passages suggest that Sextus wants to claim something stronger, that the skeptic doubts everything that is not evident. This leaves him free to assent to knowledge of appearances (that things appear as they appear we need not doubt), and to (deductive) inferences from those evident things by means of logically evident rules (like the excluded middle). On this view of skepticsm, the argument against the criterion yields evident knowledge -- that there is no criterion for non-evident knowledge.

If this reading is right, Sextus begins to look like the image of Hume that emerged from the Enquiry -- rejecting all induction, and restricting reason to the a priori. Perhaps this clarifies what seemed mystifying about Hume's view.