Tuesday, October 28, 2008

Knowingly doing wrong

In his conversation with Polus in Gorgias, as elsewhere, Plato's Socrates argues that no-one ever knowingly does wrong. We always act for what we perceive to be the good, and if our actions are not good, this is because we ignorantly take too narrow a view of the good (perhaps it seemed good for ourselves, but we overemphasized this to the exclusion of the bad it would create for others).

The question comes up in the context of a tyrant, who Socrates concedes has the power to do as he sees fit, but denies that this is the same as doing what he wants (by which Socrates seems to mean what he really, really wants -- i.e. that which is genuinely beneficial).

Do you think this Socratic view is at all defensible, or does our more sophisticated modern understanding of the complexity of human motivation make Polus' more common-sense view more plausible?

Thursday, October 9, 2008

Meno and Recollection

The famous slave-boy demonstration in the Meno purports to show that learning is possible because we already in some sense know everything. We can raise legitimate questions about whether it convincingly shows anything of the sort. Doesn't Socrates more-or-less feed the boy the answers? Doesn't calling learning recollection (anamnesis) simply beg the question of how we learned it in the first place?

Setting these interesting questions aside, however, I think we should take Socrates very seriously when he says: "I do not insist that my argument is right in all other respects, but I would contend at all costs in both word and deed as far as I could that we will be better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that one must search for the things one does not know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out what we do not know and that we must not look for it."

Whether these particular arguments work or not, then, Socrates is committed to this search. Perhaps his reasoning here is analogous to that in the end of the Phaedo, where he insists on the importance of living as though we were immortal (though we can't prove it), and attending to our characters accordingly. We found some danger in this reasoning on that occasion; is there analogous danger here?

Thursday, October 2, 2008

Elites and Elitism

The accusation of elitism has a mind-numbing effect on any conversation. Perhaps this is because we use the term ‘elite’ with two distinct senses, one as a mere description with a mild hint of approval (“Usain Bolt is an elite athlete”), and the other heavily tinged with evaluative emotions: resentment, envy, anger, and fear of our own inadequacy. In this mode the term indicates all our uneasy and contradictory responses to the experience of class.

We might think a charge of elitism would stem only from a specific accusation that a person with talents or accomplishments above the norm has expressed, in words or demonstrative actions, arrogance toward those purportedly beneath her. It suggests a lack of graciousness and humility particularly unseemly in a person of such accomplishment (from whom we expect, whether fairly or not, a well-developed moral character sensitive to others’ feelings and limitations).

Such a charge is slippery, however; it is difficult not to slide between the two senses of ‘elite’. Many people, wrapped up in unexamined fears and resentments, can easily be brought (by a careless journalist or a calculating demagogue) to think that a person who is elite in the purely descriptive sense must automatically be an elitist – that is, someone who puts on superior airs and thinks and behaves condescendingly toward others – whether she is or not. And once leveled, the charge is virtually unanswerable, because any discussion of it sophisticated enough to tease apart the muddled senses will look, well, elitist, at least to those already immersed in the emotional stew of the accusation itself, which plays on any underlying anti-intellectualism it can find.

Accusations of elitism are, for these reasons, perennially fraught and difficult to debunk. It’s a bit like trying to show that you’re not in denial; once the accusation has been leveled, you’re trapped, whether you’re Socrates or Obama.

Thursday, September 25, 2008

Philosophy and Death

One central theme of Phaedo is death, and we here see some of the roots of later Stoic antisomatism (distain for the body) in Socrates' argument that since philosophy cares primarily about and for the mind/soul, it should welcome death as entailing the happy completion of that separation. This raises many questions about how literally we should take such proto-dualist talk, and the overlay of moral evaluation accompanying it (soul good, body bad). Yet the conversation does seem to have the salutary effect of reconciling Socrates' friends (two of whom, Simmias and Cebes, are Pythagoreans for whom such mystical, otherworldly talk is like mother's milk) to his impending death, and it seems to console Socrates himself, his many qualifications (I don't insist on this, if what we say is true...) notwithstanding.

What are the dangers and downsides, if any, of adopting such a provisional, contestable view about life and death and living as though it, or something like it, were literally true?

Sunday, September 21, 2008

The Conceptual Frame

We have discussed some of the historical events leading up to Socrates' death, and touched on the quasi-oral poetic history underneath which gives us some insight into his work (and Plato's choice of literary form). One remaining piece is the conceptual, philosophical or scientific background, leading to the so-called "Socratic turn" away from speculation about the natural world, and inward, so to speak, to the investigation of oneself and one's place in a human community.

Here's a question about that "turn" on which you might perhaps all weigh in: Why do you suppose it seemed to Socrates as though he had to choose between these inquiries?

Monday, September 15, 2008

Greek Politics and the Philosopher

Having gotten a sense from Thucydides of how eloquent political speechifying could be in Athens, as well as how incredibly volatile the participatory political system was, we can get some sense of why Socrates steered clear of the Assembly and the law courts (and also why he was not necessarily a fan of the old democracy -- though it certainly doesn't follow that he was a supporter of the thirty tyrants!). Nonetheless, in Crito we see him as a devoted citizen of Athens, prepared to uphold its laws (nomoi in Greek -- we'll discuss the difference) to the death even when they make a mistake. This is an apotheosis of patriotism, but with some interesting twists -- Socrates is never uncritical, even of the gods themselve, much less the mortal laws of his city.

Saturday, September 6, 2008

Background to Plato


As I intimated on Thursday, we will discuss several key factors that I take to be essential to making sense of Plato. One is the history of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, which unfolded thoughout Plato's youth. You are reading excerpts from Thucydides' comprehensive history of that conflict, and I will give you a thumbnail overview on Tuesday of the events surrounding it as they relate directly to the execution of Plato's friend Socrates in 399 b.c.e. by the restored Athenian democracy.

Another piece of the puzzle, as I began to suggest on Thursday, is the complex relationship of Greek societies in the Fifth and early Fourth centuries b.c.e. to spoken and written language. Alphabetic writing was a relatively recent innovation (introduced probably sometime between 750 and 700 b.c.e.), and even in the late Fifth century Athens was still overwhelmingly an oral society, both in its commercial and its political dealings. Literacy was confined to a small elite, and the written word (and number) was largely a mnemonic and accounting device serving to support and reinforce memory, rather than a primary means of communication. This was changing of course, but slowly, and not without creating difficulties. As we shall see, Plato was both an advocate of new ways of doing things made possible in part by growing literacy, and at the same time deeply suspicious of writing as a substitute for interpersonal discourse (much as intellectuals today are often wary of electronics as a wholesale replacement for books, or for seminars).

Thirdly, in due course we will discuss the philosophical/scientific background to Plato's thought, beginning with Parmenides and Heraclitus in particular, and with the so-called Socratic Turn away from cosmological specuation and toward committed moral (and hence social) inquiry. Some of you have a strong background in earlier Ancient Greek thought, and you can be of service to us in helping to clarify these relationships.

A note on retaining the heading "Skeptiblog," which originally referred to a course last spring on ancient and contemporary Skepticism. In part because of Plato's artful use of the dialogue form (in which he himself never speaks), I concur with Alfred North Whitehead's assessment that in every utterance as to Plato we speak under correction. We needn't throw up our hands -- Plato's surviving writings are rich with possible conclusions -- but it is wise to be alert to our fallibility in attributing them wholesale to Plato himself.
Posted by Matt Silliman at 1:49 PM 0 comments