The famous slave-boy demonstration in the Meno purports to show that learning is possible because we already in some sense know everything. We can raise legitimate questions about whether it convincingly shows anything of the sort. Doesn't Socrates more-or-less feed the boy the answers? Doesn't calling learning recollection (anamnesis) simply beg the question of how we learned it in the first place?
Setting these interesting questions aside, however, I think we should take Socrates very seriously when he says: "I do not insist that my argument is right in all other respects, but I would contend at all costs in both word and deed as far as I could that we will be better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that one must search for the things one does not know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out what we do not know and that we must not look for it."
Whether these particular arguments work or not, then, Socrates is committed to this search. Perhaps his reasoning here is analogous to that in the end of the Phaedo, where he insists on the importance of living as though we were immortal (though we can't prove it), and attending to our characters accordingly. We found some danger in this reasoning on that occasion; is there analogous danger here?
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I can not find any analogous consequences between these beliefs. I remember a couple of dangers that stem from the belief that we should assume that our souls are immortal and live to best serve our soul; it devalues this world experiences and accepts the reasoning behind pascal's wager. Please remind me if I am missing any important other dangers.
I do not see any negative consequences in Socrates' belief that we should unconditionally pursue knowledge, even if it will not benefit our soul after this life and even if the argument that we should not pursue knowledge because we can find what we do not know is sound. Pursuing knowledge is almost always productive, healthy, and fun. There is usually no harm in pursuing knowledge, except in special circumstances. Furthermore, Socrates belief that we should pursue knowledge even if we have no obligation to our soul to do so does not seem to lead into any other dangerous beliefs.
Does anyone have any ideas on how this belief could be dangerous?
It might be possible to pursue knowledge unreasonably -- to the exclusion of more immediate responsibilities, or toward a dangerous and unwelcome bit of knowledge (e.g. thermonuclear weaponry).
So I would want to add a reasonability clause to the global injunction to pursue knowledge, though how this would function in practice I'm uncertain.
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