Last semester, Kyle wrote about Republic as embodying, in its dialogic relationships and arc, the theory of education which its conversants were describing. This has always struck me as exactly the right way to understand that dialogue (rather than as a political program, for example).
Now on this reading of Phaedrus I find myself drawn to a similar reading. Nehamas and Woodruff struggle (with some success) to decide whether the book is fundamentally about eros, or rather rhetoric (they decide on the latter). This conundrum seems much easier to resolve, however, if we read the dialogue as an instantiation of the "true rhetoric" (nearly indistinguishable from philosophy) that Socrates describes in the second part -- as applied directly to the education of Phaedrus himself. As ever, Socrates perceives the charcater of his student, and presents the truth (as far as he understands it) in precisely the rhetorical form, and using precisely the examples, likely to move that particular student.
Perhaps it is foolish even to raise the question of what one thing a dialogue this rich is about, but education comes as close to a comprehensive answer (and a basis for a complete interpretation) as we're likely to get.
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I think that Nehamas' and Woodruff's treatment of the Great Speech bears similar relevance to the topic of education. They suggest that Plato no longer believed in the theory of the forms that the speech presents at the time that he wrote it, and that, rather than an expression of his actual views, he may have intended it as an example of the kind of story that may entice a person to lead a philosophical life (p. xliii- xlvi). On this interpretation, the theories that Plato sets forth in the Great Speech seem to have functioned for him, and for his character, Socrates, as something similar to an erastes, or, put very simply, an enticing educator. This idea does not seem too far off from the idea of a hermeneutic character or device. Hermes, as I'm sure many who will read this already know, is a messenger god from Greek mythology, and often represented as a guide away from cyclical thought patterns. Hermes' messages, due to their interpretive nature, are often regarded as deceptive, but can serve to indicate a larger picture. Here it is important to note that Nehamas and Woodruff interpret Socrates' Great Speech as a means, rather than an end in itself (p. xliv- xlv). Interestingly, Nehamas and Woodruff also point out earlier in the commentary that Phaedrus was exiled from Athens from 415 to 403 B.C. for his involvement in mutilating statues of Hermes (p. xiii). Given the above interpretation of the Great Speech, this fact about Phaedrus seems to reflect his role in the beginning of the dialogue. He initiates the dialogue when he recites Lysias' speech against the involvement of love in paederastic relationships. It is in response to such a degradation of love that Socrates makes his Great Speech in defense of its powerful role in education.
This seems like a good interpretation of Phaedrus. Plato seems to have structured the text in a way to effectively describe the nature of speeches. The dialogue in the second half uses the three speeches as support for Socrates' arguments. For example, Socrates claims that a speech can be convincing whether or not it is artful, but it is artful only if the speech is delivered by someone who knows the truth (a philosopher) (260d, 262b). Being a philosopher, Socrates ends up recognizing that Lysais (a non-philosopher) has made a false speech, and proves himself able to give two convincing speeches making opposite claims.
This interpretation does not suggest that Plato believes that speech giving is as effective as the dialectic for education. He does suggest that truth can be delivered with a speech (only when given by a philosopher), but he also shows that a listener cannot be certain that what he/she heard was indeed the truth. Maybe this is why Plato still relies on the dialectic to bring out the nature of speech giving, unlike in the Republic where he used the dialectic to bring out the nature of the dialectic.
Kyle's reading seems right to me.
Nick's reminder about the connection between Hermes and Phaedrus also seems spot-on. Woodruff and Nahamas mention it in passing as a difficulty in dating the dialogue or a mark of ironic distancing, but Plato may well have also intended his audience to make the connection between Phaedrus and Hermes (all of them would know of Phaedrus' exile for the probably spurious accusation about the smashing of the Herms).
Phaedrus in a state of becoming?
Socrates: Where is that boy I was talking to?
Phaedrus: Here he is, quite close beside you, whenever you want him. (243e)
The boundaries between Socrates, Phaedrus, Eros, and rhetoric, become less distinct when we consider the possibility of role-playing used as a means to education; a way to philosophy, truth, and ultimate or supreme beauty; a way to “move” Phaedrus. If Phaedrus is indeed a “mature man” (xv) then Socrates’ references to him as a young boy may be telling. Socrates may invoke a type of mythological role-playing device to place Phaedrus in his desire. Phaedrus plays along as the beloved uncharacteristically filled with desire. (This brings him closer to a true beauty that nourishes the soul.) (xxiii) In this state of mind, (an openness of desire), Phaedrus is open to a lesson particularly catered to him by Socrates. Desire is not used to lead Phaedrus; rather, desire unites all the elements necessary for philosophical inquiry. Eros, education, rhetoric, truth, and desire, affect Phaedrus in a way that he becomes a receptor with growth as his aim. Perhaps Phaedrus makes a journey from a desire to understand Eros, to the embodiment of a boy, to philosophical inquiry and finally to truth—(as it is known to be)to feel as a beloved with desire—in this interpretation Phaedrus is in a state of becoming. Through the act of role-playing, the boy described in Lysius’s speech is realized in Phaedrus.
May we interpret verse (243e) as Socrates and Phaedrus together summoning the beloved Eros, the vital fluid of the soul so closely representative of the form beauty? And is this beauty “superficially directed at the boy” as Nehamas and Woodruff claim?. (xxxiii)
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