Bentham is the principal founder of the consequentialist moral theory we call utilitarianism. For a rather harsh critique of a fully developed application of utilitarianism (that of Peter Singer) which will help you to grasp both the nature of the theory and some of its limitations, see this article by Peter Berkowitz that I cribbed from David Johnson's Daily Phlog:
http://www.peterberkowitz.com/otherpeoplesmothers.htm
Berkowitz asserts that utilitarianism does not, contra Singer, entail the principal of equality. Bentham vigorously disagrees, and in the passage we are reading this week he gives an interesting argument for it. Let's discuss on Monday how and whether that argument works to support a rough equality of ownership.
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"Security," for Bentham, entails preserving what we own through law. Protecting what we own is detrimental because it is a representation of our labor and identity. Preserving property is also an investment in the future. It is in our best interest to "secure" our future, identity and belongings.
Bentham asserts that our security is "ever threatened, never tranquil." Such is a reason for the numerous inequalities that exist. On top of that, this ever-threatening state verifies the impossibility of achieving equality. Perfect equality requires a utopian context i.e. "The establishment of a perfect equality is a chimera"(57).
Hegel brings up a good point: "The general principle that underlies Plato's ideal state violates the right of personality by forbidding the holding of private property." Hegel believes common ownership violates our freedom and will. Common ownership can be seen as an aspect of perfect equality; as Hegel explains, common ownership would take away our most valuable form of private property, our "self." Hence Bentham's description of a perfect equality: "a chimera."
Come to find out, a chimera is much more than a delusion -- it is a mythological monster. Perfect equality is not as utopian as I thought.
There was a part of the Bentham section that we did not get to discuss in class, and therefore I would like to dicuss it here.
In his section on property, Bentham claims that "natural property" does not exist, that property exists only through law. Bentham goes on to say,
"If we suppose the least agreement among savages to respect the acquisitions of each other, we see the introduction of a principle to which no name can be given but that of law."(52)
Bentham asserts that agreement amongst "savages" constitutes as law, thereby rendering the propect of property possible. It was my belief that law was a construct of society, and that law can only exist within a society that has some method of creating and enforcing its own laws.
I feel as though Bentham broadens his definition of 'law' in order to encompass social interactions concerning the property rights of individuals outside of society. He makes the claim that property cannnot exist without law, and therefore asserts that any agreement between individuals to "respect the acquisitions" of those around them is law; it cannot be anything else.
While Bentham may not be explicitly contradicting himself in this section, am I right that the premises of his argument seem to be contrived to support his conclusion? Or is this too harsh of an interpretation of his philosophy?
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