Monday, May 3, 2010

Waldron & MacPherson

From different perspectives and in different vocabularies, Waldron and MacPherson diagnose a similar difficulty: how to understand and justify property as a general, inclusive right. MacPherson's strategy is to modify the exclusiveness of the concept, stipulatively/hypothetically re-defining property as a right to participate (not be excluded). Waldron reinforces this suggestion by observing that we already, and for good reason, accept many limitations on individual property acquisition and use.

These solutions are suggestive, and are certain to raise objections from the defenders of absolute individual property rights (notably liberatarians, but others as well). Given MacPherson's analysis of the original motivations behind those who framed these concepts, however, it is hard to see how they can do so without presenting themselves as defenders of radical inequality (i.e.: oppression).

2 comments:

keane s lundt said...

We might negate some of the concerns that are associated with absolute property ownership (that may lead to “radical inequality”) -by considering our usage of property as a privilege, not a right. In this sense Macpherson’s “right not to be excluded” might mean that persons have an individual and private piece of property with limited rights of transfer and access to public land held in commons. The notion of privilege suggests that any abuses that violate the rules society has set in place, to protect individual usage of private and common property, may result in revocation of said privileges.

Matt Silliman said...

The obvious model here is a driver's license, and law enforcement never tires of reminding us that driving is a privilege rather than a right. But this comes up against prevailing American realities -- in many places, if you can't drive it is almost impossible to hold a job, etc. (So much the worse for that way of life, we might say, but still, here we are.)

Moreover, what of Hegel's argument about property and identity? I'm afraid the simple distinction between privilege and right won't do quite enough work here.