In the section of the Enquiry called "Of the Academical or Skeptical Philosophy," Hume says again that only the sciences of quantity and number (presumably mathematics) are the proper objects of knowledge and demonstration, and that matters of fact, existence, and experience thus fall outside the sphere of knowledge and reason. Yet he does not seem to think this commits him to any invidious form of skepticism. On the contrary, he thinks we can live our lives just fine on the basis of our unargued presuppositions -- such as that there is an external world behind our perceptions -- and make our judgments of probability without claiming more for them than that they seem to work for us now.
Pete has suggested all along that Hume has made the simple error of confusing reason as such with deduction, and that even his challenge to inductive reason itself rests on induction (as David Stove suggests). Is this right, or does Hume have a point that we would be better simply stop trying to dignify mere lucky guesswork with the honorific title of reason?
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I don't think it's necessarily honorific to call informed induction reason. I resist the notion that we are as unreasonable as Hume suggests. Surely we will be corrected as more evidence enters our framework and understandings, but I think it not foolish or too generous to call what processes we bolster knowledge with inductive reasoning.
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