What to make of the dense and difficult eight deductions of Part Two? As Kyle observes, Plato seems more than ever here to want us to think these matters through for ourselves in preference to telling us what he thinks, and has even apparently thrown a few errors of reasoning in to keep us on our toes. This hardly seems fair, since we're dealing not with a mere example or simplified exercise for illustration, but with the most fundamental questions about the nature of reality, and the method for investigating it.
Among the unexpected outcomes of this process, given the scorching critique in Part One, is the necessity of forms, though how we are to conceive forms at this point remains an unsettlingly open question.
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One of the characteristics of the forms as described in other dialogues has been that one can indeed know them through logic. The Parmenides, however, seems to indicate either that logical knowledge of the forms is impossible, or that such knowledge is extremely complex. Is it possible that the dialogue intends to suggest that one must know the forms in some other way, in contrast to the precedent mentioned above? Or, as the dialogue largely illustrates the limitations of logic, perhaps it also intends to illustrate the limitations of forms as logical tools. I'm finding it difficult to feel too confident about either of these propositions, but they do seem worth consideration.
Dear Matthew:
I recently concluded a stimulating and fruitful discussion of these matters with two brilliant, yet clearly fallible, friends. But what I found most revealing, and relevant to your present concerns, is that moments of greatest discord often yield the highest returns. Best wishes,
Alison Bridges
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