Peter Barnes proposes a Commons model as a way of incentivizing conservation that avoids some of the pitfalls of conventional "two-sector" economic thinking. I suspect it is a very good and practical idea, and it will be better for the world if we implement it.
Barnes's proposal remains, however, within the paradigm of conventional economic thought, and perhaps replicates uncritically some of its problematic assumptions. Leopold insists that some important things are not economically productive, and so will be impossible to generate an interest in, even if we were to propertize them without privatizing them, as Barnes suggests.
Consider an endangered species such as the snail darter, a tiny, nondescript fish that will never be a source of revenue for anyone, not even as a tourist attraction. What would motivate us to protect it? The knowledge that species diversity is a marker of ecosystemic health, and that the snail darter in particular is an indicator species for the health of specific ecosystems, is a cogent reason but so indirect as to be nearly useless (absent an act of Congress -- aways liable to be repealed or undermined by the next president) when powerful economic interests incline us to damage its habitat.
I take Leopold's point to be that there is thus no substitute, over the long term, for an actual change of heart toward the snail darter, to value it not instrumentally but for itself. That is, we need not a strategy for manipulating self-interest, as though that were the only reliable motivator, but a different value system altogether -- an ethic.
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Observation: despite our earlier discussion of Leopold's apparent affinity for consequentialism, the ethic suggested by the above argument is basically deontic, rooted in the idea of a thing's intrinsic value (marked by the way we have learned to relate to it) grounding a responsibility for its well-being.
I disagree that we cannot find economic value for the snail darter. It can be seen as economically valuable through it's role in it's ecosystem, parts of which are certainly of economic value. I agree with Leopold that we need to improve education of the environment, but if we use this information to understand the economic value of subjects in an ecosystem it can still be an effective means of conservation.
Why not have Barnes' Public Sector own all wild animals? All wild animals would be owned, and thus protected, by the commons. Hunting and other such activities would be restricted to a certain number of kills per season (as it is now) that is best for specific species of animals. Animals that are hunted are of economic value, so there would be a fee (again, as there is now) for hunting. Species like the snail darter (that are not of economic value) would be protected in case someone decides to try to wipe them out, because they would be property of the commons.
Good efforts both. Chris has yet to show, however, how the snail darter can have meaningful economic significance, leading me to suspect that we're looking for value in all the wrong places.
Shelby's suggestion has merit, and Barnes proposes something like it in his more recent book, Capitalism 3.0. I wonder, however, what larger consideration leads us to think the snail darter is valuable, and so worthy of being owned and protected by the commons. Such economic reasoning seems to beg most of the prior questions about the value of nature...
I don't think that the snail darter has to be valuable in order to be owned and protected by the commons. The commons would not be buying the snail darter (just as it would not buy the sky, because no one previously owned the sky)and therefore would not be losing, or gaining, any money, all while protecting the snail darter.
I think the Sky Trust is an inventive proposal that challenges us to see things differently; and in a way perhaps it contains a moral code that enlightens our awareness and responsibility as stewards of the environment. The Sky Trust suggests that ‘”transparency” and accountability” are key protections that allow citizens to track funds.
But how can we be absolutely certain that manipulation and mismanagement of permits and moneys will not occur? The idea that we need “protections” at all is key I think. I agree that when we value things as “ends in themselves” we are less apt to use things “instrumentally” or as “means to ends”. However; I do not think we need a new value system or a new ethical code. I think we have at our disposal many models of ethical behavior that promote the well-being of living things including the environment and the planet. I think a universal (or as close as realistically possible) adoption or implementation of practical ethical behavior is what we need. The idea, I think, is how to get people to think instinctually, effortlessly, and naturally in a way that promotes the 'seeing' of things intrinsically rather than instrumentally and in this way we might preserve the integrity of things and ourselves.
It seems common sense to suggest that all living creatures have a basic right to life. Intrinsic value is built into this basic right and must be considered when we suggest proposals that threaten this inherent right. This action requires those who value and use things instrumentally to rationally (logically) defend their behavior.
Question for Shelby: since by hypothesis there is no economic value to the snail darter, how is the trust to generate the resources to protect it and its habitat? Somehow we will have to decide that it is valuable enough to spend money on, and it is hard to see how the trust idea can generate this valuing without looking beyond economics.
Keane's two thoughtful observations might cut against each other. Perhaps we can agree to some notion of a universal right for living (or sentient) things to exist, but this does look very much like the new value system of value you say we don't need...
I attributed the snail darter's economic significance to its role in the ecosystem. The snail darter, I assume, performs some function to maintain the ecosystem's stability. A stable ecosystem is economically superior to an unstable ecosystem, and so anything which maintains this stability (even a snail darter) is economically significant.
I think owning all animals misses the point to intrinsic value... Its hard for people to see the value a snail darter, for instance, has because they are focused so much on what the snail darter could, does, does not or could not do to benefit people, like with any animal... I think owning something takes away from its value within itself. If everyone realized people ought not to have a right towards the control of everything, more people may have an understanding towards value not just the value somethign has to benefit us. quick thought. I agree its too bad creatures are harmed at our disposal.
Matt’s comment has, for me, initiated additional reflection on what precisely constitutes a value system; and might help prevent an obvious contradiction, circular argument, or tautology on my part. If we consider a system of ethics to include a majority of the community, than we certainly need a practical plan to make that happen, or a new ethic. My focus is centered on the fact that ethical principles, promoting the intrinsic value of a basic right to life, do indeed exist. However; some people who are clearly aware of these principles choose to, rather obstinately, look the other way; prioritizing choice over ethical behavior. So in that sense, we do not need a new ethic but some type of motivating factor that compels people to act on a mass-scale in a way that reflects the logical and practical implications of sound ethical principles in existence.
The idea, I think, is the incorporation of the practical in the hypothetical. Stress on the importance of a gradual shift towards what might seem at first glance grandiose and idealistic might help keep us grounded and motivated to act. I think when people examine the ethics that constitute not only the aesthetic attributes of things but also the origins and production, (in this sense aesthetics meaning the end-product) the result is a knowing that informs our understanding and aids in our day-to-day practical decision making. In essence, how we live our lives as individuals’ matters, and the more ethical awareness and concern we display through empirical exercise, I think the more apt we are to recognize other living things as things (or beings) that deserve our sincere consideration, not as instruments but as things (means) in themselves.
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