Jamieson charts various construals of intrinsic value, but before we can decide between them we need to understand where intrinsic value comes from. My suggestion is as follows:
What we might call quantitative value (e.g. how big or hard something is -- the quantities of its primary qualities) inheres in everything: the weight (or more precisely, the mass) of a stone is a determinate value inherent in it insofar as it is a structurally coherent object. The more structurally integrated the object is, the more durable and persistent are its quantitative values, and the more clearly differentiated it is from other things.
Qualitative value, then, emerges as the systemic complexity of objects give rise to new kinds of internally interactive objects, such as organisms with brains. As this kind of complexity increases, at some point it crosses a threshold and a new kind of valuing emerges: the conscious capacity to prefer, and hence evaluate, things that the subject perceives (or conceives). This emergent capacity goes by different names (intentionality, will, autonomy...) but most generally it is the process whereby a conscious being places value on the things around it.
Only once such a capacity has emerged, I would argue, is there what we should properly call 'intrinsic value' -- the sort of value that is relevant to moral analysis. This valuing process is intrinsic not merely because it inheres in subjects, but because it is constitutive of subjectivity as such: it is the process that defines subjects as individuals. Value (of the relevant sort) thus comes from the activities of valuers.
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I'm slightly confused. Does intrinsic value, to myself, come only from my acts of valuing? That is to say, am I the only thing that is intrinsically valuable to me? Or, because I can recognize and appreciate that other humans also have the ability to value, do I find others' acts of valuing intrinsically valuable as well?
I think that we can only be aware of the intrinsic value of ourselves, and so we value other objects only by their relation to our own intrinsic value (Jamieson says "...what is of intrinsic value is what is of ultimate moral value...other things obtain their value by their relations to what is of ultimate value" (Jamieson 69).) I think by understanding that other people are in the same situation as us and are aware of their own intrinsic value we can be aware that they are intrinsically valuable, but we are not aware of their intrinsic value because we can only appreciate their value in its relation to our own intrinsic value.
There is really no easy way to hijack this thread and give a better explanation of where intrinsic value comes from. However, i will agree that qualitative value begins as the basis for creating intrinsic value. Can there be different levels of intrinsic value? As mentioned in class and again in this blog, one must be able to value things in order to hold intrinsic value. Does a human attribute more intrinsic value to their biological needs than a dog does? When do humans first hold intrinsic value; is it innate or do we acquire it over time?
Good questions, all. I'll take a stab at them. It seems to me that the only things to which we can sensibly attribute intrinsic value (of the morally relevant sort) are things that have the capacity actively to value. Greg is correct to wonder whether this capacity comes in degrees and is developmental, and I think it is pretty clear that it does and is, as these valuers came to be incrementally, growing out of the qualitative value of conscious experience. It is not that we humans value ourselves more than a dog does, but rather that our valuing is more complex, so potentially much richer than a dog's.
To reply to Shelby, I think Chris is on the right track to suggest that we tend to value other things (and other valuers) from the perspective of our sense of our own value. This is to say no more than that we see through our own eyes.
It does not follow, however, that we are incapable of realizing the independent intrinsic value of other valuers (because they of course value themselves). Humans may be better at this than dogs (or certainly than lizards), which just means we know about more intrinsically valuable beings who we need to look out for.
i have been questioning the influence of quantity on quality for a few years. around the same time i started thinking about intrinsic value. i think it is hard to get to the root of this because it is metaphysical, there is no tangible reference for us to agree upon. i think that is what it is, it is the essence of something, the most important part of something, the elements and perhaps intention that brought it into existence and it's unique function to existence. for example, if i got in a car accident and had an injury that affected my cognition i would become a different person, and yet if i lost my arm, even though i would have to adjust, it would be the same person as before that would be, therefore my arm is of instrumental value and mind of intrinsic value. that is to say, an abnormal quantity of arms (in this case) defies the expectation of qualities that a human being has which potentially affects the overall quality of which affects the quality and quantity of what i can do from that point on. this is a theory that i have formulated, i encourage anyone to point out if and anywhere this is flawed.
Interesting point, though I think the distinction even in this stark case is less clear than you suggest. As the 20th century French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty shows, without an arm you would in fact become a very different person as you adjusted to living in the world with a vastly altered set of capacities. Contrawise, though a brain injury would change you significantly, much would remain the same -- even severe amnesiacs still speak their native languages, etc., though they may not remember learning them. In neither case would you be entirely the same person, nor completely different.
By the term "metaphysical" you seem to mean "deeply mysterious" or "not yet settled." As I have mentioned in class, the term refers in ancient philosophy to the study of fundamental questions of knowledge and existence, and in contemporary philosophy it is closely synonymous with ontology. (It had an interesting period of a couple of centuries [late 18th to mid 19th centuries] when it was a term of abuse, sort of a synonym for "bullshit.") In conversations about philosophy, therefore, if you wish to be understood you should use it to mean "ontology" and choose more precisely descriptive terms for matters you deem difficult to settle.
I believe that we are born with natural insight as to what we value. This is something that may evolve from our surroundings and the people who are teaching us along the way. The feeling of real intrinsic value comes through experience and knowledge in certain areas of life. I think that we are all capable of intrinsic value through exposure to real life processes, whether they are naturally occurring or learned through the years.
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