“The first sentence says that truth is “entirely” a matter
of solidarity, so would that not mean that there cannot be truth without
solidarity, that truth implies solidarity? Further, with the second statement,
there is nothing of truth or rationality that is outside of “the familiar
procedures of justification which a given society uses,” which I took to mean “solidarity.”
Therefore there is nothing in truth or rationality that is not a matter of
solidarity.”
Bridget thus symbolizes the passage as (T & R) --> S. Since there is no indication of a conditional statement in the passage, I don't think this will work. However, she correctly interprets Rorty's sense of 'solidarity,' and it is possible (though hard to tell without more context) that he intends an inference here between the two sentences. If so the first sentence would surely be the conclusion. So we would say T & R, therefore S. To make this formally valid we would have to symbolize Bridget's interpretation as [T --> S] as a tacit premise, clearly intended if she is right about how Rorty is using the word 'solidarity.' Hence:
1) [T --> S] Tacit Prem.
2) T & R Prem /:. S
3) T 2 Simp
4) S 1, 3 MP QED
I'm afraid this argument would be viciously circular, however, since it sneakily assumes what it sets out to prove. As Peirce understands, truth had better mean more than solidarity, or all inquiry would be a sham, and whatever most people were convinced of would be true by definition -- if we all thought the earth was flat, it would be!
I'm afraid this argument would be viciously circular, however, since it sneakily assumes what it sets out to prove. As Peirce understands, truth had better mean more than solidarity, or all inquiry would be a sham, and whatever most people were convinced of would be true by definition -- if we all thought the earth was flat, it would be!
3 comments:
Actually, I suspect the most charitable reading of the Rorty passage is not as an inference but as two related statements, the second amplifying and expanding on the meaning of the first. We are otherwise compelled to accuse him of vicious circularity, which isn't very nice.
On the other hand, it's not clear that his attempt to reduce truth to 'solidarity' -- to what we can get each other to agree on -- isn't simply incoherent. Saying so isn't very nice, but it may well be true.
In my experience, it seems very unlikely that truth is a matter of solidarity. What if several groups of people agree upon opposite conclusions? Would this not mean that Adolf Hitler's Nazi regime was correct in murdering six million Jews, since it was by their consensus that they were an inferior race? Whereas, a completely different group would conclude the exact opposite, that all humans have an inalienable right to life and freedom. Both can't be true, they are polar opposite views, and yet both are agreed to as truth if it were to be determined by solidarity alone. Perhaps Rorty was talking about the entire human populace as a whole as the "solidarity"? Even so, the majority has been wrong countless times before, so what makes us conclude that the majority determines truth value?
Precisely.
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